ROSS V ODOM. INCOME TAX TREATMENT
OF PROCEEDS FROM EMPLOYER FUNDED
AND ADMINISTERED SURVIVORS' BENEFIT
PROGRAMS
Even though an independent insurance company was not
utilized, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently
held in Ross v. Odom that the proceeds from a state
established and administered survivors' benefit program were
tax exempt as proceeds of a life insurance contract under
section 101(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. This note
analyzes and inquires into the ramifications of the court's
rationale, which was based on a functional approach to the
concept of insurance and an interpretation of the legislative
history. Of particular interest is the extension of the Odom
precedent to privately funded, self-administered insurance
plans in private business.
to ever-increasing use of employee fringe benefits in private industry,' governmental bodies have been compelled to
establish similar benefit programs in order to remain competitive
with private industry in the contest for talented employees 2 One
such benefit has been the establishment of group insurance plans
for governmental employees The attractiveness of such plans was
increased recently by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
when it held in Ross v. Odom4 that proceeds from a stateestablished Survivors' Benefit Plan, which was not funded through
an insurance company but which satisfied the functional aspects of
life insurance, were tax exempt under section 101(a)(l) of the
UE

ISee generally R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 546-47 (4th ed. 1966);
Anderson & Hahn, Health and Insurance Benefits for Salaried Employees, 86 MONTHLY
LAB. R. 1266, 1267-68 (1963); Jackson, Developments in Group Insurance. 19 J. AM. Soc'y
C.L.U. 319, 320-21 (1965); Paine, Directions of Employee Benefit Plan Growth, 18 J. Am.
Soc'y C.L.U. 222 (1964).
2
See. e.g., Riddlestorffer v. Rahway, 82 N.J. Super. 36, 45-47, 196 A.2d 550, 555-56
(1963); Nohl v. Bd. of Educ., 27 N.M. 232, 236-37, 199 P. 373, 374-75 (1921); 1 J.
APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 42 (1941).
See note 2 supra.
'401 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1968).

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1969: 367

Internal Revenue CodeP as the "proceeds from a life insurance
contract.'

'

The Survivors' Benefit Program was enacted by the State of
Georgia 7 in 1953 to provide for payment of specified amounts' to
beneficiaries designated by the program participants. Each

participating employee had one-half *ofone percent of his monthly
pay deducted and paid, along with matching contributions from the

State, into the Survivors' Benefit Fund, a separate branch of state
government. The amounts payable to beneficiaries are not funded
or reinsured by any independent insurance company but are paid
out of the Survivors' Benefit Fund. However, the Board of Trustees
of the Fund is required to use an actuary in establishing and
periodically reviewing the tables, rates, and regulations of the
program to insure that they remain actuarially sound?
Robert Odom, a participant in this program, paid $662.33 into
the fund prior to his death and an equal sum was contributed on
his behalf by the State. His" widow, the named beneficiary, received
$27,450 from the Survivors' Benefit Fund. She claimed that the
amount was fully excludable from income under section 101 (a)(l)I0

as the "proceeds from a life insurance contract," while the
government contended that only a $5,000 death benefit exclusion

under section 101(b)(1)" was available. The district court held that
- INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 101(a)(l).
$Section 101(a)(1) provides: -[G]ross income does not include amounts received (whether
in a single sum or otherwise) under a life insurance contract, if such amounts are paid by
reason ofthe death ofthe insured." INT. REV. CODEof 1954, § 101(a)(1).
I GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2523 (1957). The State had previously enacted a retirement
program for its employees. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2501-29.
1 The amount receivable under the plan is computed by multiplying the decedent's monthly
salary by a certain figure. In arriving at this multiplier, the trustees of the fund take into
consideration actuarial computations of experience and expectancy factors. Amended
Survivors' Benefit Rules and Regulations Per Board Action of June 17, 1959, a copy of
which is on file with the Duke Law Journal. The amount payable to the beneficiary in Odon
under the Survivors' Benefit Program was computed as 18 times decedent's monthly
compensation as of July I, 1960.
GA. CODE ANN.

§ 40-2509 (1957).

t, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101(a)(i). Taxpayer received periodic payments from the
retirement program which were reported as eniployee death benefits under § 101(b)(I) and
were not in dispute. 401 F.2d 464, 466 n.3 (5th Cir. 1968).
101(b)(l) provides: "Gross income does not
"1 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101(b)(1).
include amounts received (whether in a single sum or otherwise) by the beneficiaries or the
estate of an employee, if such amounts are paid by or on behalf of an employer and are paid
by reason of the death of the employee."
§ 101(b)(2)(A) provides: "The aggregate amounts excludable under paragraph (1) with
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the sum of $27,450 received by the plaintiff from the State of
Georgia as survivors' benefits constituted an amount received under
a life insurance contract paid by reason of the death of the insured
excludable from her gross income under the provisions of section
101 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.12
Affirming the district court, the Fifth Circuit found that the
Georgia plan incorporated both risk-shifting and risk-distribution,
thereby satisfying every definitional element of an insurance
contract. 3 In addition, the Fifth Circuit refused to limit the
exclusion to $5,000 as an employee death benefit under section
101(b)(1), since the court could not find a mandate for such result
in that section's legislative history."
The Elements of an Insurance Contractfor Tax Purposes
While precedents as to what constitutes "amounts received
under an insurance contract . . . paid by reason of the death of the
insured" are meager, 15 the requirements for a life insurance
contract as used in the Internal Revenue Code have been considered
in several cases. All courts which have decided the issue agree that
the term insurance is used in the Internal Revenue Code to
denominate agreements or plans which have the essential insurance
characteristics, rather than only formal contracts with insurance
companies. 6 The requisite characteristics of insurance were
prescribed by the Supreme Court in its often quoted language in
7
Helvering v. LeGierse:
Historically and commonly insurance involved risk-shifting and
risk-distributing. That life insurance is desirable from an economic
and social standpoint as a device to shift and distribute risk of loss
from premature death is unquestionable. That these elements of
respect to the death of any employee shall not exceed $5,000." INT. REV. CODE of 1954,

§ 101(b)(2)(A).
" Odom v. Ross, 7 P-H 1966 FED.
Ga. Oct. 17. 1966).
"401 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1968).
"Id.

TAXES

(18 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5890)

66-5242 (N.D.

at 473.

MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 7.03, at 5 (1962).
1'See Comm'r v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288, 291 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
853 (1950); Mary Tighe, 33 T.C. 557, 564 (1959); Estate of Clarence L. Moyer, 32 T.C.

"See generally I J.

515, 535-36 (1959).
17312 U.S. 531 (1941).
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risk-shifting and risk-distributing are essential to a life insurance
contract is agreed by courts and commentators. 8
Further judicial definition of risk-shifting and risk-distribution
came in two estate tax cases involving stock exchange gratuity
funds-Commissioner v. Treganowan9 and Estate of William F.
Edmonds.20 In Treganowan, the Commissioner contended that
death benefits paid to decedent's beneficiaries out of a fund
established by the New York Stock Exchange were actually
proceeds of insurance and thus includible in the decedent's gross
estate Upon being admitted to membership and again upon the
death of any fellow member, the New York Stock Exchange
required a payment of $15 into its gratuity fund. The fund thus
accumulated and augmented by a portion of the Exchange profits
was used to finance the payment of lump sum benefits to
beneficiaries of deceased New York Stock Exchange members. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the plan
constituted insurance since the loss from the premature death of the
Exchange member was shifted from his family to the fund, and, in
turn, the risk of loss shifted to the fund was distributed to the 1373
other members by means of their periodic contributions."2 The
Edmonds case involved a similar gratuity payment made out of the
same fund, and the Tax Court followed Treganowan in holding
that payments out of the fund were proceeds of insurance.?
The same analysis of risk-shifting and risk-distribution led to a
finding that a statutory retirement benefit system constituted
insurance in Estate of Benton L. Snyder." Snyder was a teacher in
the New York City School System which had a statutory
retirement program. Salary deductions from teachers, along with
11
Id. at 539. For a discussion of the insurance fundamentals relating to risk-shifting and
risk-distributing, see S. ACKERMAN, INSURANCE 3-4 (rev. ed. 1938); I G. CoucH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 1:2-1:3 (2d ed. 1959); J. MAGEE & D. BICKELHAUPT,
GENERAL INSURANCE

20-22 (7th ed.

1964); R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK,

PRINCIPLES OF

INSURANCE 34-35 (4th ed. 1966); Comment, Estate Taxation of Employee Death Benefits, 66
YALE L.J. 1217, 1233-37 (1957); Note, The New York Stock Exchange Gratuity Fund:
Insurance That Isn't Insurance, 59 YALE L.J. 780 (1950).
" 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950).
16 T.C. 110 (1951).
2, See note 26 infra.
2 183 F.2d at 291. it is interesting to note that in Treganowan, the Internal Revenue

Service was arguing that even though no ordinary insurance policy or life insurance company
was involved, the arrangement still constituted life insurance for tax purposes.
- 16 T.C. 110 (1951).
21 14 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1067 (1945).

Vol. 1969: 367]

INCOME TAX TREATMENT

money received from the City, were used to pay retirement

annuities and death benefits. Citing Helvering v. LeGierse, the
Snyder court found that the death benefits were insurance since the

statutory plan shifted the risk from Snyder's family to the system
which in turn distributed the risk among all participating city

employees through periodic deductions from their pay checks.25
Accordingly, as in Treganowan and Edmonds, the court included
the death benefits in the decedent employee's gross estate as

proceeds of insurance on the life of the decedent.
While the LeGierse, Treganowan, Edmonds and Snyder cases

were all estate tax cases, 26 the same principles have been held
applicable to the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue

Code by cases which have considered the questionz7 and a Revenue
Ruling3l
Id. at 1068.
2 The applicable estate tax provision is INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2042 which provides:
"The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-(l) Receivable by the
executor.-To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under policies
on the life of the decedent." (Emphasis added.) Compare this wording with INr. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 101(a)(l) which is worded: "amounts received . . . under a life insurance
contract."
By contending that insurance was present in estate tax cases, the Commissioner could
increase the amount of the gross estate while in an income tax situation, an opposite
contention would allow the Commissioner to increase the amount of gross income.
"See Mary Tighe, 33 T.C. 557, 564 (1959); Estate of Clarence L, Moyer, 32 T.C. 515,
535-36 (1959). Moyer involved a stock exchange gratuity fund similar to that involved in
Treganowan and Edmonds. Payments were made by members of the Philadelphia-Baltimore
Stock Exchange upon their admission to the Exchange and upon the death of a fellow
member. The Exchange itself also transferred funds to the Gratuity Fund. Out of these
payments, amounts were paid to the survivors of the deceased members. Relying on the riskshifting and risk-distributing approach of Treganowan and Edmonds, the Moyer court found
that the "'arrangement established by the [stock exchange] constituted insurance upon the
lives of the members of such Exchange." 32 T.C. at 527. The court then went on to hold
that the payments received from the Gratuity Fund were excluded from the gross income of
the beneficiaries under section 22(b)(1) of the 1939 Code and section 101(a)(l) of the 1954
Code. "Although the arrangement under which the Gratuity Fund provided the benefits in
question did not take the form of the usual or ordinary life insurance policy or contract, we
think it contained the essentials requisite to such a policy or contract and was sufficient to
constitute a 'life insurance contract' as that term is used in the above-mentioned sections of
the Codes." 32 T.C. at 535-36. The Moyer court thereby determined that the same elements
found essential to constitute insurance under the estate tax cases, risk-shifting and riskdistributing, also constituted insurance under the income tax provisions.
" Rev. Rul. 65-57, 1965-1 CUM. BULL. 56. "The concept of insurance laid down in Le
Gierse was predicated not upon elements peculiar to the estate tax but 'upon fundamental
principles of what constitutes insurance. The concept is equally applicable to the term
2
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In the related field of health and accident insurance, several
recent cases, notably Haynes v. United States,2 9 have discussed

whether payments to employees under employer-operated and
funded health and accident compensation plans constituted

"amounts received through accident or health insurance," and thus
were excluded from gross income under section 104(a)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code3 The Haynes Court saw no reason why the

presence of an insurance company was necessary to constitute
"health insurance." 3' 1 Furthermore, in the Court's view, neither
payment of fixed premiums at regular intervals nor a definite,
segregated fund were necessary elements of insurance. Instead,
Haynes held that if a plan met the requirements of insurance under

the Helvering v. LeGierse analysis, then it qualified as an "accident
and health plan" under the Internal Revenue Code3

insurance' found in section 101(a) of the Code in reference to the income tax, as the term is
employed in that section not in any specialized sense but with its normal meaning." Id. at
58:
The Treasury Regulations seemingly do not dispute this statement. "'The term 'insurance'
refers to life insurance lof every description ......
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(a)(1). The
government also agrees with the Helvering v. LeGierse approach as constituting the
minimum qualifications for insurance as used in section 101(a)(I). Brief for the Appellant at
16 n.6, 401 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1968).
- 353 U.S. 81 (1957). The Haynes case arose after extensive litigation on the issue in the
lower courts. Courts holding for the government were: United States v. Haynes, 233 F.2d
413 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 81 (1957); Cary v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 750 (D.
Neb. 1956);, Branham v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 342 (W.D. Ky. 1955), rev'd, 245 F.2d
235 (6th Cir. 1957); Moholy v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 32 (N.D. Cal. 1955), affd, 235
F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1956); Joseph Oliva, 25 T.C. 1289 (1956). Courts holding for the taxpayer
were: Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952); Priebe v. United States, 4 P-H
1956 FED. TAXES (51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1247) 72,611 (D. Ariz. 1956); Adams v. Pitts, 140
F. Supp. 618 (E.D.S.C. 1956); Tinsley v. United States, 4 P-H 1956 FED. TAXES (51 Am.
Fed. Tax R. 1300)
72,606 (W.D. Okla. 1956); Herbkersman v. United States, 133 F.
Supp. 495 (S.D. Ohio 1955), affd 245 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1957).
For a discussion of some of the issues raised by the above decisions, see Jetter, Sickness
Benefits as Tax-Free Compensation. 39 A.B.A.J. 329 (1953); Schlenger, Disability Benefits
Under Section 22(b)(5). 40 VA. L. REV. 549 (1954); Comment, Employer Health or Accident
Plans: Tax Free Protection and Proceeds. 21 U. Cm. L. REV. 277 (1954).
The possibility of the Haynes approach being extended to the field of life insurance has
been noted by at least one commentator. See B. BI'rKER, FEDERAL INCOE ESTATE AND
GiFT TAXATION 159 n.4 (3d ed. 1964).
30 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 104(a)(3), formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1,
§ 22(b)(5), 53 Stat. 10.
1t353 U.S. at 84 (1957).
2Id. at 84-85.

Vol. 1969: 367]

INCOME TAX TREATMENT

The LeGierse Analysis Applied in Odom

By holding that the Georgia plan constituted insurance, the
Fifth Circuit in Odom appears to have followed this body of
pFecedent. Applying the "risk-shifting and risk-distributing" test
advanced by LeGierse, the Odom court found that the first
element-risk-shifting-was present. Approximately 20,000 state
employees, including the deceased, were paying identical
percentages of their monthly paycheck into the common fund out
of which definite prescribed benefits would be paid to the employee.
Therefore, to the extent of the prescribed benefit, the employee had
shifted the risk of his premature death from his family to the
fund.Y The second element-risk-distributing-was also accomplished by the Georgia plan. Since the amount of the contributions was
actuarially sufficient to pay the prescribed benefits of all employees
in the program, the risk of loss which had been shifted to the fund
was in turn distributed to a large number of people-the 20,000
contributing employees and the State.
The Commissioner argued, however, that there could be no true
risk distribution unless the employees of the State, the insureds,
paid the full amount of the premiums necessary to finance the
benefits provided.3 6 Relying on the decisions in Snyder,
Treganowan, and

Haynes, the

Odom

court

dismissed

the

3
argument as being without legal or economic validity. In Snyder, 1
part of the premiums were paid by the employer: In Treganowan,3
the Stock Exchange added part of its profits to the fund, and in
Haynes, 1 no premiums whatsoever were paid by the employees. Yet
in all three cases, the plans in question were held to be insurance.
Furthermore, the practice unchallenged by the IRS of allowing
employees in group insurance plans to pay'only part of the
premium with the employer paying the balance undercut the
Commissioner's position.40 On the basis of these prior cases and
" 401 F.2d at 468.
31See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
401 F.2d at 468. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
'See Brief for the Appellant at 17-22, 401 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1968).
31See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 19 & 22 supra and accompanying text.

31See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
10For an example of insurance industry practice, see

National Association of Insurance
Commissioners Model Bill. Group Life Insurance Definition and Group Life Insurance
Standard Provisions Adopted June 1. 1956, reprinted in 11 1956 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L
ASS' N OF INS. COMM'RS 361.

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1969: 367

accepted insurance industry practice, the Odom court rejected the

contention that full payment of premiums by employees was
necessary to constitute true risk-distributing."

A second government contention was that a ruling in favor of
the taxpayer would open the way for private employers to set up a
self-insured plan whose benefits were rendered illusory due to

uncertainty of solvency through non-funding of the plan and by the
employer's reservation of a right to cancel at will. This contention
was rejected by the Odom court since the Georgia plan provided
the employees with a binding enforceable obligation which could be
discharged through a fund assured of continued solvency."
Although the Retirement System had a right to suspend
payments,4 3 exercise of that right was closely guarded by the

courts" so that it adequately protected all participants and was
unlikely to occur. 5 Neither would an order terminating or
suspending the program prejudice the payment pending in the case
of a then deceased member." Solvency of the fund was assured by
actuarially computed contributions and benefits47 and carefully
guarded fund investments'

14

401 F.2d at 468-69.

121d.

at 473.

' "A notice by the board of trustees through the department heads to the membership

. . . shall within itself suspend any and all survivors benefit coverage then in effect." GA.
§ 40-2523(5)(b) (1957).
If a notice reinstating the benefits is not given by trustees within 12 months of original
notice, the Survivors' Benefit Plan is null and void. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2523(5)(d) (1957).
4"The action of the board in suspending benefits had to be applicable to all members alike
and could not prejudice any survivors' benefits pending in the case of a then deceased
CODE ANN.

member.

GA. CODE ANN.

§ 40-2523(5)(b) (1957).

In addition, Georgia courts have held that a citizen who accepts an offer made by a state
statute has a contract right which the State may be compelled to perform. See, e.g., Franklin
v. Mayor of Savannah, 199 Ga. 426, 34 S.E.2d 506 (1945); Winter v. Jones, 10 Ga. 190
(1851); Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 437 at 454-55 (1957). Therefore, after a member had
performed, his beneficiaries had a right to bring suit against the Retirement System to
compel payment of the death benefits.
4' 401 F.2d at 471. The right to suspend payments had not been exercised since the plan's
creation in 1953, and there was no indication that it would be exercised in the future since to
do so would destroy an integral part of the entire employee benefit plan provided by the
state.
Id. at 471-72.
41 GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2509 (1957).
IsId. at § 40-2510 (1957).
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The Interaction of Sections 101(a)(1) and 101(b)

Taking another line of attack, the Commissioner argued that
the proceeds from the Survivors' Benefit Fund, even if considered
proceeds from life insurance, were also employee death benefits paid
"by or on behalf of any employer," and therefore came under
section 101(b) which limited the exclusion to five thousand
dollars. 9 The court rejected the Commissioner's argument since it
could find no legislative intent dictating a limitation of the section
101(a)(1)5 ° exemption by the section 101(b) five thousand dollar
amount.
The predecessor of the present section 101(a) was first enacted
in 191351 and has retained substantially the same meaning since
that enactment5 2 Prior to 1951, the amount received under a life
insurance contract was the only type of death payment excluded by
the Code. Any other death benefit could not be excluded unless it
could be shown that it was a gift instead of extra compensation.p
Such treatment created an inequity since two taxpayers could
receive the same amounts by reason of the death of their
benefactors, but one would be taxed on none of the proceeds since
it came from a life insurance contract while the other would be
fully taxed on his receipts. In order to mitigate this hardship,
Congress, in 1951, enacted section 101(b)r which excluded from
gross income death benefits not in excess of five thousand dollars.
The Senate Report" accompanying the bill stated that the death
benefit provision was limited to five thousand dollars in order to
prevent abuses. Also, the Report stated that the revenue loss under
the new provision would be negligible. 56
On the basis of the wording of the bill and the language of the
report, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Essenfeld v.
401 F.2d at 473. See Reply Brief for the Appellant at 8-9, 401 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1968).
" 401 F.2d at 473.
"Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 167.
"The 1913 Act excluded "proceeds of life insurance policies paid upon the death of the
person insured." Id. Compare this language to the present section which excludes "amounts
received. . .under a life insurance contract." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101(a)(l).

53See. e.g.. Estate of Arthur W. Hellstrom, 24 T.C. 916 (1955); Ruth Hahn, 23 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. i66 (1954); Alice M. MacFarlane, 19 T.C. 9 (1952).
51INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101(b), formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch.
§ 22(b)(I)(B), 65 Stat. 483.
m S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong.., ist Sess. 50 (1951).

"Id.

1,
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Commissioner," while holding that the payments in question were
not life insurance, went on to add as dicta that even if they were
life insurance, since they were paid by the employer they would
come within the provisions of 101(b)(l) instead of 101(a)(1),
limiting the exemption to five thousand dollars. The court reached
this conclusion by reasoning that the general language of section
101(a) was over-ridden by the specific, subsequently enacted
provision of section 101 (b)?5
On the basis of the legislative history of section 101(b)(l), the
Odom court rejected the dicta of the Essenfeld case advanced by
the Commissioner to show why the amount excluded should be
limited to five thousand dollars 9 First, the court saw the legislative
history of 101(b)(1) as evidencing an intent to liberalize deductions
under section 101 since it spoke of lessening hardship, not
increasing it, and of losing revenue, not gaining it? Therefore, the
two provisions should be interpreted to allow the maximum amount
of income to be excluded 'as death benefits. In Odom this was
accomplished by holding that the payments in question fell under
section 101(a)(1) as insurance proceeds rather than under 101(b) as
death benefits. Second, the court did not read 101(b)(1) as a
specific provision which governed a general provision, since
101(b)(1) "clearly". was not intended to limit the effect of
101(a)(1)." Finally, the court felt that the Commissioner's
contention was similar to the argument that 101(b)(1) was intended
to limit the total exclusion for widow's benefits found to be gifts
under section 1022 Since this similar argument on the limitations
of an employer-paid benefit by 101(b)(1) had been rejected, 3 the
- 311 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1962). Accord, Laura V. Lilly, 45 T.C. 168 (1965). In Essenjeld,

the court said, "Even looking at the particular provision alone, we find no resemblance to
life insurance. Premium payments are not required, nor is there a shifting and spreading of

the risk of death in a meaningful sense." 311 F.2d at 209.
311 F.2d at 210.
' 401

F.2d at 473. One judge dissented on the grounds that "the history of the over-all
problem, considered with the language and juxtaposition of the two provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 . . . show a congressional intent . . that the payments to the widow
. . . are to be governed . . . by the provisions of Section 101(b) .
Id. at 474 (Fahy,
J., dissenting).
£401 F.2d at 473; see S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 50 (1951).
"401 F.2d at 473.
Id. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 102 provides: "'Gross income does not include the
value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance."
3

In Rodner v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 233, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), the court stated in
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court felt the present argument should meet the same fate." For

these reasons, the Odom court allowed the taxpayer to exclude the
full death benefit of $27,450 from her gross income.
Analysis of the Odom Rationale

Emphasizing substance over form,

5

the rationale in Odom

makes the availability of a section 101(b) exclusion depend on
whether the plan underlying the death benefit is functionally

equivalent to a plan funded through an ordinary life insurance
company. When the Georgia Survivors' Benefit Program is

compared to a straightforward insurance company plan,66 it is
apparent that the two are functionally indistinguishable. Both
dicta that -the general language exempting gifts is controlled by the particular language of
section 101(b) limiting the death benefits by $5,000. Gifts in general are exempt but gifts in
the form of death benefits are taxable insofar as they exceed $5,000." Thereafter, the
Internal Revenue Service began to litigate the issue of whether 101(b)(l) limited 102. In
United States v. Reed, 277 F.2d 456 (6th Cir. 1960), the court, in a per curiam opinion,
approved the decision in 177 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Ky. 1959), which had rejected the
government contention that 101(b) was designed to limited the gift exclusion under 102. The
Internal Revenue Service, in Rev. Rul. 60-326, 1960-2 CuM. BULL. 32, announced that it
would not follow the Reed decision. However, in Poyner v. Comm'r, 301 F.2d 287, 29091 n.7 (4th Cir. 1962), the government refused to argue that Section 101(b) limited the
provisions of Section 102. The Internal Revenue Service accepted this position in Rev. Rul.
62-102, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 37, which said: "'The Internal Revenue Service will no longer
contend that section 101(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 applies to limit to $5,000
the exclusion from gross income of an amount paid to the widow of a deceased employee,
where the payment otherwise qualifies as a gift excludable under section 102(a) of the Code."
401 F.2d at 473.
SId. at 468, 470, 471; see, e.g., Comm'r v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S.
308, 315 (1956); Estate of Weinert v. Comm'r, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961).
For a discussion approving the use of such a functional approach for employee death
benefits, see Comment, Estate Taxation of Employee Death Benefits, 66 YALE L.J. 1217,
1237-47 (1957). That comment states: "[Tr]he functional analysis also seems appropriate
when death benefits are paid directly by the employer and not by a commercial insurance
company." Id. at 1240.
"Moreover, the employer can even duplicate the insurer's 'terminal reserve' operation by
deducting actuarially predicted mortality costs from projected earnings. In this manner, risk
can be spread among all participating employees, though actuarial calculations are
necessarily less certain due to the small sampling of individuals involved." Id. at 1242.
Uncertainty in the actuarial calculations in the Georgia plan were greatly reduced since there
were over 20,000 state employees taking part in the program, thus increasing the sample size
and improving accuracy.
" Such a straightforward plan would be one in which employee/employer contributions are
paid over to an insurance company as premiums on a policy covering all the employees. The
Commissioner admits the tax-exempt nature of proceeds from such a plan. See Reply Brief
for the Appellant at 5, 401 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1968).
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programs seek to alleviate the financial burden placed upon the
deceased employee's survivors by monetary payments. Both systems
use actuarial computations designed to predict the amount of
premiums which will be sufficient to support the payment of
predetermined benefits.17 Assured solvency of both plans is achieved
through carefully restricted and 'guarded investment of the
premiums.6 8 Both plans involve the requisite risk-shifting and riskdistribution. The only distinction which the Commissioner could
draw between the Georgia plan and one funded through an
insurance company was the failure of the state plan to provide for a
conversion privilege. However, a conversion privilege, as noted by
the court, is not a necessary element of an insurance contract.,9
On the issue of the interaction of sections 10 1(a) and 101(b), the
court's disapproval of the Essenfeld dictum seems in accord with
the purpose of section 101 as evidenced by its legislative history. A
Senate Report accompanying the bill which became section 101(b)
of the 1954 Code, stated that the exclusion granted by section
101(a) was limited to life insurance payments and did not extend to
death benefits paid by an employer.70 This conclusion, however, as
to the non-exclusion of employer payments under 101(a), was made
without reference to Treganowan and its progeny, and most likely
indicated the committee's failure to conceive of an employer
making a payment in the capacity of an insurer. When an employer
pays death benefits pursuant to a plan which qualifies as insurance
under the Treganowan precedents, he is not acting as an employer,
but as an insurer, and such payments should come within the
exclusionary ambit of section 101(a).
When Congress spoke of correoging a hardship by excluding five
thousand dollars of death benefits paid by the employer under a
pre-existing contract, they probably were not referring to an
employer death benefit which constituted life insurance since it was
" GA.

CODE ANN. § 40-2509 (1957).

- Id. § 40-2510.
"1401 F.2d at 470-71. A conversion privilege is the right of the insured to exchange the
term contract for permanent insurance at some time.in the future. See generally S.
ACKERMAN, INSURANCE 27 (rev. ed. 1938); 1 G. RICHARDS, LAW OF INSURANCE § 15 (5th
ed. W. Freedman 1952); J. MAGEE & D. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 697 (7th ed.
1964). All of these commentators agree that a conversion privilege is only one of many
different variables which can make up a group life insurance contract.
"S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1951).
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already fully excluded and posed no hardship.7' The Odom court

correctly interpreted this intention when it determined that when a
payment was found to be life insurance, it would not be limited by

section 101(b).
The use of a functional approach to determine whether an

employer's payment is insurance will not, contrary to government
contentions, 72 rule section 10l(b)(1) a dead letter in the law. Instead,
it will relegate the five thousand dollars exclusion to situations

where it is particularly beneficial-the area of voluntary payments
to widows of deceased employees which are made due to a custom

or out of a feeling of charitable considerations. 73 Prior to the
enactment of section 101(b)(1) these payments would have been
fully taxable unless it could be shown that a gift was intended 4
The Impact of Odom

The immediate effect of the holding in Ross v. Odom should be
an increased interest in self-funded plans by those state

governments having similar provisions creating a self-funded
retirement and/or death benefit plan35 As noted above,76 the area
of fringe benefits is becoming one of the most important selling

points in the quest for talent. By providing a tax-free benefit plan
for employees' beneficiaries, a state government could add a selling
point to its position in the employment market.
However, since the court did not limit its decision solely to
7 S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1951), stated that the Code provisions prior
to the enactment of the present section 101(b) granted exclusion only to life insurance
payments and did not extend to employer-paid death benefits. But under the estate tax
section analogous to the predecessor of 101(a) referred to in the Senate report, a payment
received under a fact situation similar to that in Odom had been held to be insurance in
Estate of Benton L. Snyder, 14 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1067 (1945). Therefore, it seems that
payments such as those received in Snyder and Odom were not considered employee death
benefits under the predecessor of 101(b) and should not be so considered under the new
provision since there is no evidence of congressional intent to effect this change.
n See Reply Brief for the Appellant at 5, 401 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1968).
"See I J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 7.09 at 18 (1962).
"See note 53 supra.
" For examples of statutes establishing death benefits plans similar to the Georgia plan,
see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 108 , §§ 14-101 to -201 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IND. ANN. STAT.
§§ 60-1601 to -1638 (1962). For examples of statutes providing only retirement benefits but
which could be adapted to provide death benefits similar to Georgia, see ALA. CODE tit. 55,
§§ 456-75 (1960); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-741 to -764 (1956).
",See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
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governmental use, there will probably be an attempt to extend the
Odom rationale to justify employers' use of self-funded plans to

obtain a potential cost saving by eliminating the "middleman."

7

Although the Odom court was apparently worried about the

possibility of abuse in this area, 78 a court which looks to the
substance rather than the form of individual employer plans should
preclude unjustified tax benefits 9
The Odom case suggests the requirements which a private plan
would have to meet in order to qualify as "substantive insurance."

First, of course, "risk-shifting" and "risk-distributing" would be
required. Second, there would have to be a definite, separate fund"

I

n See generally Jackson, Self-Insurance and Group Insurance, 16 J. A,%i.
Soc'Y C.L.U.
304-05 (1962).
78401 F.2d at 471. Such abuse could occur if an employer was allowed to set up a selfinsurance plan, make contributions to a fund completely under employer control, and reserve
the right to cancel the program at will or refuse to pay individual claims as they came due.
401 F.2d at 471. Such a plan could cause abuse in several areas. First, the employer would
still have control over the fund which could be used for working capital purposes. Second, if
the yearly contributions were to become bothersome, the plan could be terminated with no
liability on existing claims. Third, especially in close corporations which experience little
turnover in ownership, the plan would provide a tax-free method of transferring retained
earnings to the owners. See note 85 infra and accompanying text.
1See generally Comm'r v. Hanse, 360 U.S. 446, 461 (1959); United Grocers, Ltd.
v. United States, 308 F.2d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 1962); Morgan v. Comm'r, 277 F.2d 152,
153 (9th Cir. 1960); Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 539, 543
(D. Vt. 1964), affd per curiam. 342 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1965); Metropolitan Co. v. United
States, 176 F. Supp. 195, 200 (S.D. Ohio 1959). The Odom court rejected several
government contentions as being based on form, rather than substance. These arguments
included the necessity for a contract with an insurance company, 401 F.2d at 468, the lack of
risk-distribution when the employees did not pay all of the necessary premiums, id., and the
necessity for the inclusion of a conversion privilege in the contract, id. at 470-71. The court
preferred to analyze the substance of the plan under the test outlined in text generally
accompanying notes 80-81 infra.
$oAlthough the Odom court emphasized the existence of a separate, carefully invested fund
as one of the features of the Georgia plan which prevented abuse of the plan by the
employer, 401 F.2d at 472, the Supreme Court, in Haynes v. United States, 353 U.S. 81, 84
(1957), stated there was "no necessity for a definite fund set aside to meet the insurer's
obligations." However, in Haynes. the plan in question was one of health insurance which
necessarily involves benefits payable to the individual which are contingent both as to time
and amount. Therefore, a health insurance plan would not lend itself very well to
manipulation to enable a tax-free transfer of retained earnings from the company to the
individual through exclusion from gross income under § 104, since there is no certainty that
any amount will ever be paid. But in a life insurance plan, such as Odon, the amount of
benefits were certain and the event upon which they were payable was one certain to occur.
Such a life insurance plan would easily adapt itself to a tax-free transfer of retained earnings.
See note 85 infra and accompanying text for an example of how such a transfer would be
made. The requirement of a separate, carefully invested fund would reduce the possibility of
abuse since the employer could not use the fund for any purpose other than for providing
insurance benefits.
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which would be carefully invested. In this regard, a court might
require, as did the Georgia statute,8 that investments be made

according to standards followed by life insurance companies in that
particular state. Third, definite prescribed benefits would be

required which, following sound actuarial principles, were capable
of being met out of the fund. Finally, there would have to be a
binding contract to pay the benefits, upon the fulfillment of certain

conditions. The Commissioner's contention that such a scheme would
provide untaxed compensation in the form of employer-paid

premiums 82 could be met by including in the employee's gross
income the employer-paid premiums for the amount of insurance in
excess of $50,000 on the same basis used for group-term life

insurance purchased by employers. 83 Since uniform premium rates
are established by the Commissioner, employees receiving benefits
under such a self-funded plan would be taxed on the same amount
of premiums as would employees covered by an ordinary group

insurance plan
A second argument advanced by the Commissioner against such

a "functional" approach was that companies could set up such a
plan, call its contributions "premiums" and achieve a tax-free
distribution of retained earnings through the exclusion of the death
benefits from the employee's gross income under 101(a).8 5 The
possibility of this abuse seems negligible. The employer's

contributions, when made, would be placed in a separate fund
which could not be used for ordinary business purposes,." and
"GA. CODE ANN. § 40-2510 (1957).
"Reply Brief for the Appellant at 6, 401 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1968).
INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 79(a) provides: "There shall be included in the gross income
of an employee for the taxable year an amount equal to the cost of group-term life insurance
on his life provided for . ... under a policy (or policies) carried . . . by his employer (or
employers); but only to the extent that such costs exceeds the sum of (1) the cost of $50,000
of such insurance, and (2) the amount (if any) paid by the employee toward the purchase of
such insurance."
mActually, the employee who participates in the self-funded plan might be overtaxed under
the uniform rates since a higher premium would be required to purchase a contract
containing "extras" such as conversion privileges which are normally found in group
insurance plans but would nbt be found in the self-insured plan. However, with a uniform
rate, the employee will have an amount sufficient to purchase these "extras" included in his
taxable income, whether he receives them or not.
" Brief for the Appellant at 14-15, 401 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1968).
"The Odom court was worried that retention of funds under the employer control could
lead to uncertainty of solvency. "401 F.2d at 47 1.
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employer-paid premiums for insurance in excess of $50,000 would
be taxable to the employee." Therefore, it seems that this is
identical to the requirements imposed upon an employer who
purchases an ordinary life insurance policy, and could not be
Viewed as any greater an abuse.
While it seems probable that a Private employer could qualify
for treatment similar to that accorded the Georgia plan, the
obstacles which he might encounter are numerous. In order to
facilitate payments to beneficiaries, the employer would have to
establish some system for handling claims which could involve
more personnel and a great deal of paperworkPs Also, competent
actuarial assistance would be required to establish the fund and
insure its continued effectiveness. 9 In addition, the federal
disclosure laws" could apply to the insurance system, requiring still
more paperwork. Finally, since the employer is providing insurance,
he might find himself subject to state insurance laws." Therefore,
while such private plans would be allowable under the rationale of
Ross v. Odom, the attractiveness of such plans may be seriously
hampered by the administrative and legal problems of putting them
into operation.

" See notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
u See generally Jackson, Self-Insurance and Group Insurance. 16 J.AM. SocY C.L.U.
300, 305-06 (1962).

ld. at 308.
o29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09. These sections cover, among others, "any plan, fund, or program
which is communicated or its benefits described in writing to the employees, and which was
. ..established by any employer . . . for the purpose of providing for its participants...
[death] benefits .... " Id. at § 302(a)(1). Plans falling within the above category must
publish, among others, a description of the plan and a detailed annual financial report. See
generally Seligman, The Federal DisclosureAct, 15 J. Am. SocY C.L.U. 79 (1961).
" See generally People v. Cal. Mut. Ass'n, 441 P.2d 97, 68 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1968):
Maloney v. Am. Independent Medical & Health Ass'n, 119 Cal, App. 2d 319, 259 P.2d 503
(1953); State v. Anderson, 195 Kan. 649, 408 P.2d 864 (1965); Associated Hosp. Serv. v.
Mahoney, 161 Me. 391, 213 A.2d 712 (1965); Texas v. Memorial Benevolent Soc'y, 384
S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).

